We investigate the maintenance of overlay networks under massive churn where an adversary may churn a constant fraction αn of nodes over the course of O(log n) rounds. In particular, the adversary has an almost up-to-date information of the network topology as it can observe an only slightly outdated topology that is at least 2 rounds old. Other than that, we only have the provably minimal restriction that new nodes can only join the network via nodes that have taken part in the network for at least one round.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-To-Peer (P2P) has proven to be a useful technique to construct resilient decentralized systems. In a P2P architecture, the nodes are connected via the Internet and form a logical network topology, a so-called overlay network, on top of it. Within the overlay each node has a logical address and logical links that allow it to search and store information in the network. A key requirement for all applications that rely on P2P networks is reliable communication between all nodes, i.e., each node should be able to send a message to any other node at all times. This is complicated by the fact that in every large-scale system, errors and attacks are the rule rather than the exception. At the same time there is usually no or only little admission control for new participants. This implies a massive amount of churn, i.e., nodes joining and leaving the network, at any given time. In fact, empirical studies have shown that 50% of all nodes are subjected to churn over the course of an hour [1] . Thus, there is a dire need for robust, distributed protocols that maintain connected overlays in spite of heavy churn.
In this work we deal with the problem of maintaining a routable overlay under adversarial churn. We define an This work was partially supported by the German research council (DFG) in the context of the collaborative research center "On-the-Fly Computing" (SFB 901) This work is supported by the German research council (DFG) Research Training Group 2236 "UnRAVeL" overlay as routable, if each node in every round is able to send a message to a given logical address p ∈ [0, 1). Further, the churn is controlled by an adversary. In each round, the adversary picks a set of nodes that leave the network and proposes a set of nodes that join the network. It is easy to see that an adversary that knows all connections between the nodes can simply partition the network by churning out the neighborhood of a node. Previous theoretical works, e.g., [2] , [3] , [4] , therefore considered models where the adversary has slightly outdated information about the nodes' connections. In particular, the adversary could access all information that is at least O(log log n) rounds old, where n is the minimal amount of nodes in the network. This includes the nodes' connections, internal states, random decisions, and the content of all messages etc. Within these O(log log n) rounds, the nodes execute a distributed algorithm that completely rearranges the network topology. However, the techniques presented in these papers cannot be used if one wants to grant the adversary access to even more recent information. To overcome this, we propose a trade-off in form of an (a, b)-late omniscient adversary that has almost up-to-date information about the topology, but is more outdated with regard to all other aspects. In particular, it has full knowledge of the topology after a rounds and complete knowledge of messages, internal states, etc. after b rounds. In the real world, an adversary with similar properties could, e.g., be an agency eavesdropping at Internet exchange points. They can see who communicates based on the involved IP-addresses, but are unable to decrypt the messages (or take a long time to decrypt them).
Our main contribution is a distributed overlay maintenance algorithm that completely rearranges the network every 2 rounds and can therefore handle a (2, O(log n))-late adversary. Further, the algorithm allows to route a message to a logical address p ∈ [0, 1) within O(log n) rounds. The algorithms are randomized and the results hold with high probability(w.h.p. 1 ). The overlay is an extension of the Linearized DeBruijn Graph presented in [5] (which itself is based on the DeBruijn Graph and ideas from [6] ) that uses quorums of logarithmic size to send and receive messages. The latter is adapted from [7] where the authors use this approach for the Chord-Overlay. We further present a robust algorithm that minimizes the number of messages sent in every step. Our approach uses several structural properties of the overlay as well as a careful analysis of non-independent events to ensure the fast reconfiguration of the network.
A. Model
We assume that time proceeds in synchronous rounds 2 and observe a dynamic set of nodes V := V 0 ,V 1 ,... such that V t is the set of nodes in round t. Each node is identified by a unique and immutable ID. A node can send a message to another node only if it knows its ID. In a real-world network these IDs could, e.g., be the nodes' IP addresses. This results in series of graphs G :
|u sends a message to v in round t}. Observe that each G i is a directed graph. Creating an edge may be compared to sending a UDP message to the desired receiver. We assume that a node can create edges to O(log n) different nodes in each round and can send O(log c n) bits via each edge. Note that we assume that an ID is of size O(log n).
We assume that V is determined by an adversary. That means, in every round t the adversary can propose a set O t ⊂ V t−1 that leaves the system and a set J t ⊂ V t that joins the system such that it holds V t :
In particular, the adversary has to comply to the following rules: 1) Lateness.
As mentioned in the introduction, the adversary is (2, O(log n))-late omniscient. That means it has slightly outdated knowledge of the topology, i.e., the series of graphs G := (G 0 , G 1 ,...) created through the communication between nodes. In particular, since our adversary is 2-late in round t the adversary has full knowledge of all graphs until G t−2 . Further, it has no knowledge of the nodes' internal states and the contents of messages for O(log n) rounds. That means it learns the content of a message sent in round t only in round t + O(log n).
For all V t it holds that |V t | ∈ [n, κn] where κ ∈ R is a small constant. In other words, the number of nodes stays within Θ(n). For a suitable value T ∈ O(log n) we assume that V t+T ∩V t ≥ (1 − α)n where α ∈ R is a constant. This allows the churn to be O(n) in each round as long as there is a stable set of size Θ(n) that remains in the network for at least T rounds. 3) Bootstrap Phase.
We assume that until a round B ∈ O(log 2 n) the adversary is inactive and no churns happens. We call this the bootstrap phase. Note that several other works also assume a bootstrap phase to prepare the random sampling (cf. [2] , [3] , [4] ). Only after the bootstrap phase, the adversary may begin churning nodes in or out. 4) Restricted Join.
Further, we assume that a new node v ∈ V t \V t−1 can only join via a node w ∈ V t ∩V t−2 . In this case we say that v 2 Synchronicity is a standard assumption in the related work as nodes need to react to the adversary's changes in a timely manner. joins via w in round t. In Section II we show that this is a necessary condition. Last, the number of nodes that join the network via the same node v ∈ V t is constant 3 . This model incorporates the observation from [1] that new nodes join and leave very frequently but there is a (relatively) stable set of older nodes. Note that to the best of our knowledge this is the most flexible model compared to the related work.
Given all these constraints, a round t consists of the following four steps: 1) At the beginning of each round the adversary can select a set of nodes O t ⊂ V t−1 that leave the network. These nodes do not receive any messages and leave the network immediately. Further, the adversary may propose a set of nodes J t that join the network in round t. For each node v ∈ J t the adversary selects a bootstrap node w ∈ V t \ J t that receives a reference to v. 2) Next, all nodes that are still in the system receive all messages sent in the previous round. This even holds holds for messages that have been sent by churned out nodes. 3) After receiving all messages, a node can perform calculations on its local variables and the received messages. 4) Finally, each node may send messages to other nodes, given it knows the respective ID. Note that sending a message to another node implicitly creates an edge. Every message sent in round t is received in round t +1. Further, these edges can be seen by the adversary at the beginning to round t + 3.
B. Related Work
There has been extensive work on analyzing overlay networks under high adversarial churn. As already mentioned in the introduction, these works had a variety of different model assumptions. See [2] for a comprehensive survey on previous results. In the following, we only focus on works closely related to ours.
First, there was a series of papers (cf. [9] , [7] , [10] ) that assumed only a subset of nodes is subjected to adversarial churn. However, these nodes could also try to sabotage the overlay's maintenance and the routing by sending corrupted messages. A general assumption was that up to a constant fraction of nodes would be malicious. In [9] Scheideler presented a protocol that spreads these nodes over the network such that each connected subset of logarithmic size contains a constant fraction of non-byzantine nodes. Fiat et al. [7] build upon this work and presented a full overlay maintenance algorithm that provided a robust DHT. In their approach, each virtual address p ∈ [0, 1) is maintained by a committee of O(log n) nodes. We will reuse this idea in our work.
In more recent works all of the nodes are subjected to adversarial churn and not only a fixed set. However, these works usually do not consider byzantine behavior. The adversary in these papers can be described by three properties: The lateness, the churn rate, and if it is immediate. We say an adversary is (a, b)-late if it has full knowledge of the topology after a rounds and complete knowledge of all sent messages, internal states, etc. after b rounds. The churn rate is (C, T ) if the adversary can perform C join/leaves in T rounds. Last, an adversary is immediate if churned out nodes have to leave the network immediately and without the possibility to send and receive more messages. Table I shows an overview over the different models. Note that the table is only for comparison as it simplifies some of the models and does not depict all of their respective nuances. However, these simplifications do not weaken the adversary.
Augustine et al. [3] present an algorithm that builds and maintains an overlay in the presence of a nearly completely oblivious adversary. Here, the overlay no longer has a fixed structure but is an unstructured expander graph of constant degree. Note that this overlay has no virtual addressing. However, in [8] the authors present a scheme that allows to quickly search for data in these networks.
Further, Drees et al. [4] build a structured expander, a so-called H d -Graph, which is the union of d random rings. Their adversary is not only O(log log n)-late with regard to communication, it also has access to all nodes' memory and all sent messages after O(log log n). Nodes that are churned out in round t may remain in the network until some round T ∈ O(t + log log n). Thus, it is not immediate.
Last, the SPARTAN framework presented in [2] probably bears the greatest resemblance with our work. In SPARTAN the nodes maintain a logical overlay resembling a butterfly network. To ensure robustness each of the butterfly's virtual nodes is simulated by O(log n) nodes. The key difference between our work and SPARTAN is the adversary's lateness. Just as [4] SPARTAN assumes the adversary to be (O(log log n),O(log log n))-late, but in return allows the churn to be as high as αn in O(log log n) rounds. However, other than [4] SPARTAN allows the adversary to be immediate.
C. Our Contribution & Organization of this Paper
In this work we present an algorithm which, given a dynamic set of nodes V := V 0 ,V 1 ,... chosen by an (2, O(log n))-late adversary, creates a series of graphs G := G 0 , G 1 ,... with G i := (V i , E i ), such that it holds w.h.p. that G i is routable, i.e, each node can send a message to a logical address p ∈ [0, 1).
The paper is organized as follows.
• In Section II, we show that our model assumptions are necessary in order the solve the problem. In particular, we show that any adversary can partition a network where nodes can join via nodes that themselves just joined one round ago. Further, we prove that our model requires the adversary to be at least 1-late with regard to the topology. • In Section III we introduce the Linearized DeBruijn Swarm (LDS). This graph topology is based on the linearized DeBruijn Graph presented by Richa et al. [5] and the concept of swarms used by Fiat et al. for the Chord overlay network [7] . • In Section IV, we present a routing algorithm for the LDS, which optimizes the congestion if we want guaranteed message delivery. In this section, we also define when a dynamic overlay is routable. • Section V contains this paper's main contribution, an algorithm that rearranges the graph topology such that it is completely rebuilt every 2 rounds but still allows routing. The message complexity is O(log 3 n) messages per node and round w.h.p 4 . Due to space limitations all proofs are omitted from this version and only sketches are presented. For the full version we refer the interested reader to [11] .
D. Preliminaries
In this section, we present some definitions and results from probability theory that we will use in the analysis of our algorithms. During our analysis we deal with both dependent and independent random variables. The following general class of random variables will prove to be useful: Definition 1 (Negative Association). Let X := (X i ) i∈I be a set of random variables. Further, let f , g be monotonically increasing (or decreasing) functions defined on disjoint subsets of X. Then is X is negatively associated (NA) if it holds:
Note that all independent and hyper-geometric random variables are always NA [12] . Further, we make heavy use of the Chernoff bounds, which are defined as follows.
Lemma 1 (Chernoff Bounds). Let X := ∑ X i be the sum of negatively correlated random variables with X i ∈ {0, 1} and let E[X] = μ. Then it holds
II. IMPOSSIBILITY RESULTS AND LOWER BOUNDS
In this section, we present two fundamental impossibilities with regard to our model. First, we show that it is impossible to maintain a connected overlay under massive churn and a (0, ∞)-late adversary that always has up-to-date information about the topology, but is oblivious of everything else. Second, we show the necessity that new nodes can only join via bootstrap nodes that are in the network for at least 2 rounds.
As an auxiliary lemma we show that any adversary with a churn rate (αn, O(log n)) can completely exchange the set of nodes within O(log n) rounds if α is a constant. Therefore, it simply churns out the nodes in chunks of size αn. Formally, it holds:
Consider any (a, b)-late adversary with churn rate (αn, O(log n) for some constant α ∈ (0, 1). Then within O(log n) rounds the adversary can replace the entire node set.
We now show the impossibility for a (0, ∞)-late adversary.
Lemma 3. A (0, ∞)-late adversary with churn rate (αn, O(log n)) for some α ∈ (0, 1), can disconnect any overlay in O(log n) rounds.
The idea behind this proof is as follows. Consider a node v ∈ V t joining the network in round t via some node w ∈ V t . Then only w knows v and may send it some some IDs of nodes w ∈ V t . A 0-late adversary can immediately detect and churn out these nodes if v tries to communicate with them. Further, it churns out w and all nodes it communicated with. Thus, no node in the entire system can ever learn v's ID. Together with the strategy from Lemma 2, the adversary can isolate v within O(log n) rounds. We continue with the restrictions for the joining nodes. The result is stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.
Let v ∈ V be a node that joined in round t. Now assume a model where in round t + 1 a new node w ∈ V can join the network via v. Then a (∞, ∞)-late adversary with churn rate (αn, O(log n)) for some α ∈ (0, 1) can disconnect any overlay after O(log n) rounds.
For the proof, consider a set of nodes v t ,...,v t+T such that each v i joins via v i−1 in round i. We will see that an adversary can isolate v t+T for a a big enough T . For each v i let I i be the set IDs that v i initially receives from v i−1 . Via induction one can show that I i ⊂ I i−1 . Since the adversary can churn out V t ⊃ I T in O(log n) rounds, the lemma follows for T ∈ O(log n). Note that this impossibility is different from the similar statement in [3] because we allow a node to communicate with O(log n) different nodes instead of constantly many.
III. THE DEBRUIJN SWARM
In this section, we present our overlay, the Linearized DeBruijn Swarm (LDS). Therefore, we we combine a wellanalyzed network overlay of low degree, i.e., the Linearized DeBruijn Graph (LDG) presented in [5] , [13] , with techniques from robust overlays, i.e., the usage of logarithmic quorums that simulate a single node [7] . Note that the LDG is inspired by but not equivalent to the classical DeBruijn Graph.
Throughout this work we assume that each node knows n and κ, i.e, the upper and lower bound for the nodes currently in the network. We make this simplification due to the fact that the number of nodes stays relatively stable. Furthermore, we denote λ := log κn for easier notation 5 . All of our presented algorithms may be adapted to work with close estimates of λ and λ n . For this one could use the approaches presented in [5] , [7] , [14] , [15] .
In the remainder of this section we present the LDS's topology and show some of its basic properties: To define the edges of the LDS, each node v ∈ V chooses a position in p v ∈ [0, 1) independently and uniformly at random. Whenever we want to use the position of a node v ∈ V , we just write v instead of p v for convenience. It should always be clear from the context if we mean the node, its ID, or its (current) position. If it is important to distinguish between this properties, we will make it clear.
All nodes can calculate the distance to another node via the distance function d : V 2 → [0, 1). Given two nodes v, w ∈ V the function d returns the shortest distance between v and w in the [0, 1)-torus. For convenience we introduce the following notions for the relation between two nodes u, v.
In the LDG presented by Richa et al. [5] each node v connects to exactly six other nodes: The two closest nodes left and right of p v and the two closest nodes left and right of the points p v 2 and p v +1 2 respectively. For the LDS, we now extend this, such that each node connects to the O(log n) closest neighbors of these points. For a given point p ∈ [0, 1) we call S(p) ⊂ V the swarm of p. It holds that v ∈ S(p) if and only if d(v, p) ≤ cλ n where c > 1 is a robustness parameter which should be chosen as small as possible. These swarms (and not the nodes) will be the building blocks of our overlay. Formally the LDS is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Linearized DeBruijn Swarm). Let V ⊂ [0, 1) be a set of points with |V | = n and λ := log n. Then, the LDS G c := (V, E L ∪ E DB ) with parameter c ∈ N has the following properties:
. Over the course of this paper we will refer to the edges in E L as list edges, whereas the edges in E DB are DeBruijn edges. Further, we call the swarms S(p) adjacent to S(p ) if there is an edge (v, w) between every node v ∈ S(p) and w ∈ S(p ).
Note that according to the definition each node has connections to all nodes in an interval that is bigger than its swarm. We see the reason for this in the following lemma:
Lemma 5 (Swarm Property). Consider any point p ∈ [0, 1) and its swarm S(p) ⊂ V . Then S(p) is adjacent to S( p 2 ) and S( p+1 2 )
Last, we see that all swarms have roughly the same size w.h.p. if the nodes chose their positions independently and uniformly at random. Lemma 6 (Swarm Size). Assume the swarm size to be cλ n with c ≥ 36k and further, assume that all nodes pick their position independently. Then for a point p ∈ [0, 1) it holds:
As the swarms are of size cλ in expectation, the result follows from a simple application of the Chernoff bound.
IV. ROUTING AND SAMPLING IN THE LDS UNDER CHURN
In this section, we present the low-congestion routing algorithm A ROUTING . This algorithm allows every node in an LDS to route a message to a logical address p ∈ [0, 1). Note that A ROUTING delivers each message w.h.p. even in the presence of churn and a changing communication structure. We furthermore present a sampling algorithm A SAMPLING that allows each node in an LDS to send a message to a node picked uniformly at random.
A. Preliminaries
Before we go into the details of our algorithm, we will first recall the classical LDG's routing algorithm (cf. [5] , [13] ), which our algorithm is based on. Routing in the LDG works by the bitwise adaption of the target address: Recall that each node knows λ . Given any destination p ∈ [0, 1) a node can calculate the first λ bits (p 1 ,..., p λ ) of p's binary representation. Then, starting with the least significant bit p λ , the node v sends the message to the node closest to x 1 := v+p λ 2 . For this, it uses the corresponding DeBruijn edge. After that, the message is sent to the node closest to x 2 :=
. This goes on until the first bit p 1 . After that, there are w.h.p. only O(log n) hops over list edges left to p. Formally this path can be described by the so-called trajectory, which is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Trajectory). Let v ∈ V be a node and p ∈ [0, 1) be an arbitrary point. Further let (v 1 ,...,v λ ) ∈ {0, 1} λ and (p 1 ,..., p λ ) ∈ {0, 1} λ be the λ most significant bits of v and p respectively. Then the trajectory τ(v, p) := x 0 ,..., x λ +1 ∈ [0, 1) λ +2 is a series of points defined as follows:
Given this definition, the Linearized DeBruijn Routing can described as follows: For each point x i the trajectory, forward the message to the node closest to it. Then, forward the message along list edges until it reaches the target.
We now wish to adapt this algorithm for a dynamic series of graphs D := (D 1 , D 2 ,...) where each D i is a LDS. The obvious solution would be to send the message not only to the closest node of each trajectory point but to the whole swarm. However, there are two problems we need to address, the churn orchestrated by the adversary and the dynamic reconfiguration of the overlays.
First, one can easily see that this routing algorithm fails in the presence of churn. Given that any node on a message's trajectory can be churned out, a fraction of routing requests may never reach their destinations. In particular, if the adversary is aware of the topology, it could churn out the whole swarm for a given trajectory point. Thus, we introduce the notion of a good swarm adapted from [7] . A swarm is good if at least a constant 3 /4-fraction of its nodes take part in the next round and hence refer to such nodes as good. Further, a LDS is good if all its swarms are good. This property implies that there is always at a constant fraction of good nodes in each swarm that can forward the message. Note that the value 3 /4 is only chosen for an easy analysis.
Besides the churn, there is the problem of the dynamically rearranging overlay. In particular, our algorithm will create a series of overlays D 1 , D 2 ,... which will persist for only 2 rounds each. That means, a node changes its position every 2 rounds. If every node would keep all its routing messages and forward them from its new position, they would lose all the progress they made so far. To overcome this, we define the so-called handover using a helper graph H i : For any point p ∈ [0, 1) let S i (p) be the swarm of p in D i and likewise let S i+1 (p) be the swarm of p in D i+1 . We assume that during the change from D i to D i+1 each node from S i (p) can send a message to any set of nodes from S i+1 (p), i.e., the nodes from a helper graph H i where the swarms S i (p) and S i+1 (p) are adjacent. Therefore, the switch can be handled like every other routing step from one swarm to another. In Section V, we will see how to implement such a handover whereas here we just treat it as a property for a simpler description. Last, note that we call a helper graph H i good if for each p ∈ [0, 1) a 3 /4-fraction of all nodes in S i+1 (p) is not churned out in the next round.
We summarize our observations in following definition for a routable series of graphs:
B. The Routing Algorithm A ROUTING
We now present the routing algorithm A ROUTING for a dynamic series of routable graphs D := (D 1 , H 1 , D 2 , H 2 ,...) in detail. A trivial extension of the routing algorithm sketched in the previous section would send each message to the whole swarm of each trajectory point. However, forwarding a message to a whole swarm would require O(log 2 n) messages to be sent in each step. We wish to limit this to only O(log n) messages 6 . Therefore, we adapt this approach as follows: Assume a node v ∈ V t wants to route a message m. First, m is forwarded to all nodes in its swarm S(v). Then, each node in the swarm picks r ∈ Θ(1) nodes in the next swarm S(x 1 ) and sends m to them. These r nodes are picked uniformly and independently at random. Then, each node that received m at least once, forwards it to r nodes in S(x 1 ) and so on. Only in the last step the message is forwarded to all nodes of the target swarm to ensure that the whole swarm receives the message.
Analysis: In this section, we analyze A ROUTING and show the following result: H 1 ,. ..) be a routable series of LDS defined on nodes V := (V 1 ,V 2 ,...). Further, let each node v ∈ V 1 start k messages to random targets p ∈ [0, 1). Then A ROUTING with a suitable parameter r ∈ Θ(1) delivers each message in exactly 2λ + 2 rounds and congestion O(rk log n) per round w.h.p.
We begin the proof by showing that each messages reaches its target swarm after exactly 2λ + 2 rounds if it is not churned out:
Let v be any node in V 0 , which sends a message to point p using A ROUTING . Further, let τ(v, p) be the message's trajectory. Then it holds w.h.p. that any copy of the message reaches a node in S i (x i ) after exactly 2i steps (if it is not dropped due to churn).
The proof follows from an induction. In each even step the message is forwarded along the trajectory (and thus moves from S i (x i−1 ) to S i (x i )) whereas in each odd step the message is handed over (and thus moves from S i (x i ) to S i+1 (x i )). Lemma 5 and the handover property imply that the nodes have the necessary connections for each step. Since the trajectory's last point is with distance cλ n to p w.h.p. for a big enough c, the lemma follows.
Up to now we assumed that the message is forwarded in each step. We did not consider the fact that not all nodes of a swarm forward the message as they may be churned out before they can do that. Of course, if a complete swarm is churned out, the message surely can't be forwarded. As stated before we assume that all swarms are good and only a small constant fraction of each swarm is malicious and does not forward the message. Under this assumption we that enough messages are forwarded to sustain the routing. The idea is to view the forwarding step as a balls-into-bins experiment where the messages are balls and the good nodes in the next interval are bins. One can easily verify that the number of bins that receive at least one ball is NA (see, e.g., [12] for a proof). Thus, if more than, say, half of all nodes forwarded r copies of the message, then more than half of all good nodes in the swarm receive the message w.h.p. for r big enough (but still constant). In particular, the value r depends on the swarm's size and the number of good nodes, but not on n. A simple induction then yields the lemma.
We conclude the analysis by observing each node's congestion. Therefore, we first bound the expected number of trajectories that cross an interval in each round. Note that a trajectory is defined on points in [0, 1) and not on actual nodes (except the first and last element). We can see that it holds:
Lemma 9. Assume all nodes choose their position independently and uniformly at random from [0, 1). Moreover, let each node node sent k messages to targets picked independently and uniformly at random from [0, 1). Last, let I ⊂ [0, 1) be any interval and let X j I be the random variable that counts how many trajectories have their j th step x j in I. Then, the following two statements hold:
• E[X j I ] = kn|I|, and • X j I is the sum of independent, binary RVs. We can now simply proof the congestion bound by application the Chernoff Bound. 
C. The Random Sampling Algorithm A SAMPLING
Besides routing to a random swarm S(p) for some p ∈ [0, 1) the algorithm A ROUTING can also be extended to send a message to a node chosen uniformly at random. We call this algorithm A SAMPLING . The underlying approach is adapted from King et. al. in [14] , [15] and works as follows. A node picks a random destination p ∈ [0, 1) and a random number Δ ∈ [0, 2cλ ]. The sampling then proceeds in two steps: The node first routes the message to the swarm S(p) using algorithm A ROUTING . Then, the message is only delivered to the node w ∈ S(p) for which it holds |{u | u ∈ p, w }| = Δ. If there is no such node, the message is discarded. However, all surviving messages are uniformly distributed.
V. THE MAINTENANCE ALGORITHM
In this section, we present our main contribution, an algorithm that maintains a routable dynamic overlay D = (D 0 , H 0 , D 1 ,...). In the following, we assume a (2, 2λ + 7)late adversary with a churn rate ( n 16 , 4λ + 14). Further, we assume that the number of nodes in any round is at most (1 + 1 /16)n. Note that the values α = 1 /16 and κ = (1 + 1 /16) are chosen for convenience. Further, we require a bootstrap length B := 2λ + 4.
We further assume that the system starts in an initial LDS D 0 in round 0. This assumption is made for convenience as the initial overlay can easily be constructed in the churn-free bootstrap phase using algorithms from [16] . Using their techniques this can be achieved in O(log 2 n) rounds with a deterministic algorithm. Furthermore, the congestion and degree of each node is polylogarithmic, so it fits into our computational model. Since our focus lies on fast reconfiguration and not on optimizing the bootstrap phase we omit the algorithmic details and their analysis. For ease of notation we will refer to round t + B simply as t.
We continue with some notation. If we want to refer to all nodes except the newly joined in a round t we write V t := V t ∩ V t−1 . Over the course of this chapter, we distinguish between two types of nodes in each round t: First, M t ⊆ V t are all the nodes that are in the network for more than λ = 2λ + 4 rounds (or 2λ + 5 if they joined in an even round). We refer to these nodes as matured. Second, F t ⊆ V t are all nodes that joined the network less than λ rounds ago. We refer to these nodes as fresh. Observe that V t := M t ∪ F t , so a node is either mature or fresh.
On a high level our algorithm has two building blocks, the subroutines A LDS and A RANDOM which are executed in parallel. The two algorithms ensure the following two properties: 1) After the bootstrap phase, A LDS creates a series of overlays D = (D 0 , H 0 , D 1 , H 1 ,. ..) that contains all mature nodes in a given round. In particular, in each even round t = 2i the algorithm constructs a D i , an LDS which consists of all mature nodes V t−λ . In each odd round t = 2i + 1, the algorithm creates an the helper graph H i in which for each p ∈ [0, 1) it holds that S i (p) and S i+1 (p) are adjacent. The algorithm roughly works as follows. Each node v ∈ V t−λ picks a position p i v ∈ [0, 1) uniformly at random and routes it to S i−1 (p i v ) along with its ID where it arrives in round 2i − 2. Then, within two rounds, A LDS first constructs the handover graph H i−1 and a new LDS D i based on these positions. Note that this ensures that in the even rounds the forwarding step from A ROUTING can be performed and the handover in the odd rounds. Thus, A LDS maintains a routable overlay.
2) A RANDOM ensures that (after the bootstrap phase) each fresh node v ∈ F t is known to δ ∈ O(log(n)) mature nodes which are part of D. This ensures that these node can route a message on behalf of the fresh nodes via the overlay D. On a high level, A RANDOM works as follows: In every round each mature node sends out τ ∈ Ω(δ ) messages containing the node's ID. We call such these messages tokens for short. The tokens are sent to nodes picked uniformly and independently at random using a variation of A SAMPLING . In particular, this ensures that each node v ∈ V t ∩ V t−2 receives Θ(τ) token w.h.p. in every round after the bootstrap phase. These tokens are then used by the fresh nodes to send their ID to δ ∈ O(log n) random mature nodes (which are part of an LDS).
Listing 1: Overlay Maintenance Algorithm A LDS 1 Desc: In every even round 2t the algorithm creates a LDS Dt consisting of all nodes that joined the network before round 2t − λ and performs the Forwarding Step from AROUTING. In every odd round 2t + 1 the algorithm performs a handover from Dt to Dt+1 using a helper graph Ht . 2 3 Note: The following code is executed by each node u ∈ Mt every even and odd round respectively. The messages are handled in the given order. The last block of commands in each phase is executed after all messages have been handled. 4 5 Even Round
u creates edges to these nodes 8 9 Upon receiving JOIN(v, p t+1 v ) from AROUTING 10 Send 
The main result of this section (and this paper) is stated in the following theorem: This chapter is structured as follows: We first describe the two subroutines separately in more detail. Then, we show that A LDS maintains the first invariant. Thereafter, we show that A RANDOM ensures the other one. Last, we analyze the algorithms' congestion.
Maintaining a Routable Overlay via A LDS
We will now describe the construction of the overlays H i and D i+1 in detail. In the following assume the system is currently in an even round t = 2i and in all previous rounds the mature nodes formed a routable overlay D := D 0 , H 0 ,...,D i . In round 2i each node w ∈ S i (p i+1 v ) receives a message of the form (v, p i+1 v ). This message was started 2λ + 2 rounds ago using A ROUTING and contains a node v's ID and its new position p i v . Each node w ∈ S i (p i+1 v ) now forwards (v, p i+1 v ) all its neighbors in the current overlay D i−1 . These messages arrive at their targets in round 2i + 1. Thus, in round 2i + 1 each node in D i knows a set of nodes and their new positions in the next overlay D i+1 . To be precise, we will see that it holds for each p ∈ [0, 1) that every node w ∈ S i (p) knows the IDs of every node v ∈ S i+1 (p). Hence, we have constructed the Handover Graph H i from D i to D i+1 in round 2i + 1. Finally, all nodes iterate over all received messages (v, p i+1 v ) and introduce v to all its known neighbors in D i+1 . By introduction, we mean that the neighbor's ID and position is sent to v. We will see that for every neighbor w of v in D i+1 there is a node which knows both v and w in round 2i+1. Then, in round 2i+2 each node know its neighbors in new overlay D i+1 and creates an edge to them. Thus, all mature nodes form the overlay D i+1 .
Note that after round t = 2i + 1 no edge of D i is ever used again and the nodes' positions in D i and D i+1 are in no relation each other. Therefore, the adversary stays oblivious of all nodes' current positions.
Further, observe that our approach requires that both the fresh and the mature nodes send out the join requests and that all messages take exactly the same time to reach its destination. The latter is ensured through A ROUTING . For the former, we assume that each fresh node is known by least one mature node, which is part of D i . This, however, will be maintained by A RANDOM and explained in the next section.
Listing 1 presents the pseudocode for the algorithm. Each node has the two variables D u t and H u t . D u t stores u's neighborhood in D t whereas H u t stores the references for the handover. Both variables may be reset at the end of each round. We have two types of messages, JOIN(v, p i v ) represents a join request and CREAT E(v, p i v ) is used to construct D i . Both contain the ID of a node v and its position in p i v in D i . Further, we see how the pick their position uniformly and independently at random through a uniform hash function h : V × N → [0, 1) known to all nodes. This hash function takes the node's ID and the current round t = 2i − λ as an input and computes a random value p i v . The mature nodes send out requests on behalf of each fresh node w ∈ F t known to them. Note that each node can compute h(w,t) if it knows w's ID. The IDs of these nodes are stored in the variable C. This variable is set by A RANDOM . Details on how it is set can be found in the next section.
Maintaining a Random Overlay via A RANDOM
In this section we present A RANDOM in detail. This algorithm that ensures that each fresh node is known by at least δ 2 ∈ O(log n) randomly chosen mature nodes each round w.h.p. The algorithm works in two phases: First, all mature nodes distribute τ tokens containing their IDs to all nodes. This distribution works in three steps: 1) In the first step, the token is to send to a mature node picked independently and uniformly at random. For this, the mature nodes use A SAMPLING . 2) Recall that the each fresh node is known by at δ 2 mature nodes. A mature node that knows a fresh node assigns it a unique number in [0, 2δ ] such that each number is assigned to at most one ID. If more than 2δ fresh nodes are known, a set of 2δ IDs is picked at random and assigned to [0, 2δ ].
Listing 2: Random Overlay Algorithm A RANDOM 1 Desc: In each round t each fresh node that joined after round t − λ connects to Θ(δ ) mature nodes that joined before t − 2λ 2 3 Note: The following code is executed by each node u ∈ V every round t. All types of messages are received in the given order. The last block of commands is executed after all messages have been handled. 4 5 Round t 6 Upon receiving TOKEN(v) from node u :
Tokens ready to be used 8 9 Upon receiving CONNECT (v) from node v: 3) For each token that a mature node v ∈ M t receives in step 1 a fair coin is flipped. With probability p = 0.5 v keeps the token and uses it for the newly joined nodes. Otherwise, the algorithm uniformly picks a random number from [0, 2δ ]. If there was a fresh node assigned this number in step 2, the token forwarded is forwarded there.
If not, the token is dropped. Note that this preserves the independence of each token as the coin is independently flipped for each token and choice of the random number is also independent.
After the tokens are distributed to the nodes, they can used to introduce the fresh nodes to the mature nodes. Therefore, we then distinguish between two cases:
1) Each fresh nodes v ∈ F t that is in the network for at least one round uniformly picks δ tokens it received and sends its ID to the corresponding nodes. 2) For each fresh node v that just joined the network in round t, the bootstrapping node w ∈ V t uniformly picks δ tokens it received and sends v's ID to the corresponding nodes. Furthermore, the newly joined is supplied with δ tokens for the next round. Recall that we require w ∈ V t ∩V t−2 , so each node that is in the network for more than one round will receive a continuous stream of tokens.
Note that at the end of round t, a node forgets all its incoming connections from fresh nodes and the assignment of numbers is reset.
Listing 2 depicts the pseudocode for A RANDOM . We use two types of messages, TOKEN(v) and CONNECT (v). Both messages only contain a nodes v's ID. The former is used to spread the mature nodes' IDs, the latter is used send a fresh node's ID for sampling. Note that all token that are ready to be used for introduction are stored in the variable T . Further, the array (c 1 ,..., c 2δ ) stores the assignment of numbers to IDs. It holds c i = v if v's ID is assigned to i. If no ID is assigned to i we write c i = ⊥. Note that the set C mentioned in Listing 1 consists of all c i = ⊥. Last, note that a node can distinguish whether it received a TOKEN(v) message through Algorithm A SAMPLING , i.e., in step 1 of the sampling process sketched above, or directly from a node, i.e., in step 3.
A. Analysis of A LDS
In this section we show that A LDS maintains a dynamic overlay with the properties needed for routing. Throughout this section we assume that A RANDOM works correctly and each fresh node is connected to Θ(δ ) mature nodes at any time. Thus, every node in the networks starts a join request in every round. In the remainder of this section we will prove the following:
In the following, we assume that the algorithm is currently in round t = 2i (after the bootstrap phase 7 ) and the overlay D t := (D 0 , H 0 ...,D i ) was routable until this round. This implies that the mature nodes know all neighbors in D i , all join requests (v, p i+1 v ) started λ rounds ago are delivered. Since D i is good, a 3 /4-fraction of each swarm survives until 2i + 2. We will now show that A LDS maintains the following three properties:
1) A LDS successfully constructs H i in round 2i + 1, 2) constructs a new LDS D t+1 in round 2(i + 1), and 3) all swarms S i+1 (p) are good w.h.p. Together, these three properties imply that D t+2 :=
First, we show that A LDS constructs H i in round 2i + 1. Therefore, we need to show that every node in S i (p) knows the references of every node in S i+1 (p). However, this follows directly from the routing's correctness and the swarm property.
. We continue with the construction of D i+1 . In particular, we wish to show that every mature node v ∈ S i+1 (p) creates an edge to each of its new neighbors in v ∈ S i+1 (p). We can divide the neighbors into two sets: 1) the list neighbors left and right of p i+1 v , and 2) the DeBruijn neighbors left and right of p i+1 v 2 and p i+1 v +1 2 . 7 Since in the bootstrap phase there is no churn the algorithm can trivially build the good graph D 0 and route all messages.
The proof's idea is straightforward: For all nodes v and v which will be neighbors in D i+1 we show that w.h.p. there is at least one node w that receives the messages (v, p t+1 v ) and (v , p t+1 v ) in round 2i + 1 and thus introduces the nodes. Lemma 13.
Finally, we must show that a 3 /4-fraction of each swarm S i+1 (p) will not be churned out until round 2i+3. This implies that that H i is good in the handover step and D i+1 is good during the forwarding step. Recall that each swarm S i+1 (p) consists of all nodes that started a join request in round 2i + 2 − λ . The maximal number of nodes that started a request is bounded by 17 /16n. Further, we assumed the churn is bounded by ( n /16, 4λ + 14) . Thus, at least 15 /16n nodes survive until round 2i + 3 and are thus good. Hence, the overall ratio of good nodes in D i+1 is at least 15 /17. However, this does not imply that each swarm has a 15 /17 fraction of good nodes. To proof this, we recall that the adversary is oblivious of the nodes' swarms before round 2i + 3. Formally: This insight effectively reduces the adversarial churn to randomized churn as the adversary is oblivious which nodes belongs to which swarm. Now we can easily show that the good nodes evenly spread over the swarms. Since all nodes choose their positions (and thus their swarms) uniformly and independently at random we can apply the Chernoff Bound and show the following: Lemma 15. Assume the swarm size to be cλ n with c ≥ 36k. Let now S t (p) with p ∈ [0, 1) be any swarm in D t . Further, let the G t ⊂ S t (p) be the set of good nodes in S t (p). Then it holds:
Thus, for an appropriate choice of the constant k each swarm and thus the graph D i+1 is good w.h.p.. Finally, Lemma 11 follows from the combination of lemmas 12, 13 and 15. This concludes the analysis of the maintenance algorithm.
B. Analysis of A RANDOM
In this section we show that every fresh node is able is send its ID to at least δ 2 mature nodes each round w.h.p. and thus stays connected to the network. In particular, we assume that δ ∈ O(log n). We will proof the following lemma:
Lemma 16 (Random Overlay Lemma). Assume that until round t each fresh node was connected to at least δ 2 good nodes each round. Then it holds w.h.p. that each v ∈ F t successfully connects to at least δ 2 good nodes. We prove the lemma in several steps. First, recall that each mature node starts τ token in every round. We can show that these tokens are uniformly distributed among all nodes.
Lemma 17. Assume Lemma 16 held until round t. Further, let X(v, w) denote the event that a token sent by v reaches w in round t. Then the following two statements hold: 1) Each token (regardless of its origin) reaches a node v ∈ V t with the same probability p v ∈ [0, 1). Formally:
We now show that each node receives O(τ) tokens w.h.p. To prove this we make use of a simple balls-into-bins argument. Each nodes receives τ|V t−λ | |V t | tokens in expectation since τ|V t−λ | tokens are started in each round and the distribution is uniform. Recall that at least 15 17 n mature nodes start τ tokens and there are at most 17 16 n nodes in round t. Hence, the expected number of token is not smaller than 15τ 16 . Note that each bootstrap node must receive O(δ ) tokens every round to supply newly joined nodes with connections. In particular, each node v ∈ V t needs 2δ tokens for each new node that joins via v in t. Further, recall that a fresh node v ∈ F t needs at least δ additional tokens for itself to stay connected. Since only a constant number of nodes join via v every round cδ ∈ O(log n) is sufficient for a big enough constant c. Since all token are independent a simple application of the Chernoff bound implies that all nodes receive enough tokens w.h.p. for a big enough τ := c δ .
In the following we can assume that each fresh node v ∈ F t sends a connection request to δ nodes. However, these requests can still fail for two reasons: First, the node has been churned out or second, it has received more than 2δ requests and does assign a number to v.
We begin by showing that only a small fraction of connection request are sent to nodes that are already churned out (or will be churned out in the next round). In other words, most tokens belong to good nodes.
Lemma 18. Each fresh node has at least 14 17 δ connections to good nodes w.h.p.
The proof of this lemma is straightforward. Due to its lateness the adversary cannot anticipate where a node will send its tokens. Thus, the tokens of good and bad nodes will spread to the fresh nodes uniformly at random. In expectation each fresh node roughly receives a 15 17 fraction of good nodes. Since the sampling is independent, this implies there is at least a 14 17 fraction w.h.p (for a big enough τ) due to the Chernoff Bound. Since a fresh node randomly draws the tokens for the connections without replacement there are 14 17 δ successful connections in expectation. Since drawing without replacement is NA, an application of the Chernoff Bound concludes the proof.
It remains to show that the following:
Lemma 19. Each mature node receives at most 2δ connections from fresh nodes w.h.p.
The proof consists of two steps: First, we show that each mature node receives no more than δ connection requests in expectation. Second, we show that the number of connection requests is NA through some technical arguments. A final application of the Chernoff Bound yields the lemma for a big enough δ .
C. Congestion
Finally we show that it holds:
Lemma 20. Algorithms A LDS and A RANDOM have congestion of O(log 3 n) per node and round w.h.p.
Theorem 2 now follows from lemmas 11, 16 and 20 and the union bound.
VI. FUTURE WORK & CONCLUSION
We presented an algorithm that maintains a structured overlay in presence of a (2, O(log n))-late adversary. We permit αn deletions/additions over the course of O(log n) rounds. Note that this is exponentially higher than in [2] and [4] . However, both their algorithms are not possible if the adversary has more recent knowledge of topology. This suggests a strong connection between an adversary's lateness with regard to the topology and permitted churn. For future work, one could consider finding an algorithm that tolerates a (1, O(log n))late adversary. Also one could consider a hybrid model where the adversary has almost up-to-date information about some nodes but is more outdated with regard to others.
